Few relationships have slid from a warm and growing friendship to blood-stained enmity as India and China did in 1962. Perhaps the unexpectedness of the break in the relationship and a mutual belief that the other was the aggressor substantially dented the trust that existed before the war. The rupture has been papered over—diplomatic exchanges are in place, occasional participation in multilateral forums brings the two to a common table, and trade is flowing freely. Yet the two Asian powers continue to eye each other with muted hostility. The border—the Line of Actual Control—has mostly remained quiet, but a few skirmishes, the deadliest at Galwan in 2020, have regularly raised the temperature and militated against bridging the 64-year-old rift.
Meanwhile, as is the nature of things, the world has not only changed but change itself has accelerated, producing new realities with breathtaking regularity. The pole position of the US is coming under a slow but sustained challenge from China; the Indian growth story, though the envy of the world, has lagged in comparison with its giant neighbour; and economy, not weaponry, has become the preeminent measure of power. India’s perceptions of the US have undergone a revision after the overt hostility shown by Donald Trump’s administration toward India.
The status quo is the obvious antithesis of progress. Should the India-China relationship remain hostage to a war that happened in another age? Or should we take a leaf out of the warring nations of the Second World War—Germany and England, France and Germany, the US and Japan—and seek new avenues for moving ahead? Does such an enterprise have sufficient payoff, and is it even possible to pursue with the spectre of the unresolved border still hanging over the region?
Let me state two obvious realities that must guide this discussion. First, China is our neighbour, and as our late Prime Minister Vajpayee had once remarked, we can change our friends, but our neighbours are here to stay. Second, China is already a world power in its own right, and it may become the leading superpower in a matter of decades. In a clear-eyed view of China’s ‘unstoppable’ rise, a Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani argued in his 2020 book (Has China Won?) that “it is not an accident that China has not fought a major war in forty years….This lack of military action reflects both a powerful civilizational impulse and a deeply pragmatic view of power.” President Trump referred to China as one of the countries of ‘G2’, signalling to the world how China’s rise was being viewed by Washington.
These two paradigms—China’s geographical proximity and the inevitability of its rise–-are interconnected for us and must be factored into our approach towards China.
What are the other factors that dictate that we must unshackle ourselves from mistrust and defensiveness, and reimagine this critical relationship?
The Shifting Dunes of the World Order
The US appeared to pivot inexplicably away from India, pursuing policies that hurt India’s core interests. India, along with Brazil, became the bearer of the cross of the highest tariffs in the world. To make matters worse, the US President publicly warmed up to India’s bete noir, Pakistan, even dining with its Chief of the Army Staff in the White House while simultaneously contradicting the Indian government’s stand on Operation Sindoor. India has long considered its relationship with the US as one of the stabilising factors for itself, and this change has thrown a pall of uncertainty, even anxiety, over that equation. It is true that India continues to be a co-member with the US in the Quad grouping, but it is equally relevant that Quad itself appears to have lost some relevance in the calculus of US policymakers.
Here are a few takeaways from the geopolitical situation described above: One, India is right in pursuing strategic autonomy, but that must be enacted in reality, and not be performative sloganeering. That would require an economy and manufacturing depth that allow India the freedom to chart its own course. Two, India cannot afford to yoke itself to a superpower like the US for long-term strategic support, which, by extension, goes against the aspiration of strategic autonomy. Three, an improved and stable relationship with China will reduce uncertainties and vulnerabilities. Crucially, the last will help India achieve the first two.
Economic Dependence
Despite the Galwan clashes of 2020, trade between India and China has continued to grow. The two-way trade in the year of that fateful clash was USD 3 billion. In 2026, it stands at USD 144.45 billion. Of this, China exports goods and services worth USD 129.19 billion to India.
The asymmetry is not forced onto India; it imports goods that cannot be produced in India or would not be cost-effective if manufactured at home. These include electrical goods, electronics, telecom equipment, machinery, pharmaceutical ingredients, and iron and steel. Should such a vast dependency be allowed to exist in an environment of political instability? It is axiomatic that if the relationship between the two countries improves, the factor of certainty would allow seamless trade and growth on both sides of the LAC. The alternative would foster uncertainty at the least, and a fracture if another conflict brews up.
But What About the Border Question?
In countless forums, I have heard speakers lament that China is not keen to solve the long-standing border dispute. The votaries of this argument never seem to pause and answer this: in the event of negotiations, can any Indian government agree to barter land with China, and politically survive the storm it would create? Or, is it anybody’s case that China, which is laying claim to most of Arunachal Pradesh, would tamely agree to our version of the alignment and sign on the dotted line? The truth is that it is not in our interest to poke that beehive for now. I argue that the border question should be put on the back burner, while we pursue the strengthening of all other areas of our relationship.
Will China agree to such a stratagem? History tells us that the Chinese have always shown strategic patience over difficult problems. There is no reason why we cannot mirror their approach.
Take China’s boundary issue with Russia. They clashed in 1969, but then the border remained peaceful, and the two countries engaged in cooperation on other fronts. It was only in 2008 that the final agreement was inked, when a great deal of trust had been developed.
China’s refusal to rush into annexation of Hong Kong till the lease expired, and even Taiwan, gives us a template that we need to follow.
The Growing Chinese Chokehold
For decades, one has heard about the deliberate expansion of a Chinese footprint in India’s neighbourhood. China’s influence in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives has been seen by Indian policymakers as malevolent and mischievous. Of course, the ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan has long been a strategic thorn in India’s side. China’s support for insurgents in the North-east in the past has been another sticking point in the relationship. Overtures towards India’s close ally, Bhutan, have also not gone unnoticed in New Delhi.
Here is a counterintuitive argument. A closer, even friendlier relationship with China will dilute this vulnerability, not increase it. We must not let China’s friendship with Pakistan be a factor in our thinking; every country is free to pursue relationships as per its national interest. Instead, India must take a larger view and a higher road, and move ahead with improving its ties with China. Some incipient steps have already been taken, such as the resumption of flights between India and China. Incidentally, these flights are reportedly fully booked every day. The Mansarovar yatra has resumed, and a few border trading points have reopened. In 2025, Prime Minister Modi visited Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit; President Xi reciprocated by attending the BRICS meeting in New Delhi, earlier this year.
Make Haste, Slowly
This is not an argument for plunging forward without guardrails to protect us during the journey. Nor is this argument to revive the treacle of sentimentality that governed India’s relationship with China prior to the 1960s. Instead, there is a case for moving forward cautiously and systematically. We will, however, have to stop taking counsel from the trauma of 1962 if progress is to be made.
Tangible steps can be proposed in areas of people-to-people exchanges, border trade, educational exchanges, joint research, better crisis communication, and multilateral collaboration.
The engagement must be calibrated; any areas or technologies that India does not wish to expose must be ring-fenced. Our guard must not be lowered. Development of border infrastructure must continue with the dual purposes of improving connectivity for the people and assisting in defensive build-up should that eventuality arise again. Friendship and deterrence are not mutually exclusive in this narrative.
Conclusion
There is a strong case for jettisoning the decades-old status quo over our equation with China. A closer relationship is neither capitulation nor a discarding of our territorial claims. It is an imaginative approach to reducing our vulnerabilities, creating greater space for economic growth and, by extension, strengthening our hand in prosecuting strategic autonomy. It is the right strategic choice to be made today, and not left for another day.
